What the war in Ukraine means for Asia

When Russia invaded Ukraine it jolted the democracies of East Asia—Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, all allies of America. A trip to Japan suggests to Banyan that, as the conflict in Ukraine enters its third year, its implications for East Asian policymakers grow only starker. In Europe the talk is of whether Ukraine can hold on despite dwindling American financial support and the spectre of a second Trump presidency. The consequences for peace in Asia would be devastating if Ukraine loses. A win for President Vladimir Putin might embolden China to reshape the regional order on its terms.

The implications are greatest for Taiwan. China wants to absorb it, by force if necessary. To Taiwanese the parallels between what Mr Putin is doing to Ukraine and what China’s Xi Jinping might do to Taiwan are stark—especially as the two men claim a friendship with “no limits". China has been upping the military tempo with incursions into Taiwan’s air and sea space. In response, in August the Taiwanese government unveiled a record defence budget, equivalent to 2.6% of GDP—not enough to deter China, yet bigger proportionally than most of Europe.

The incoming president, William Lai Ching-te, promises to increase spending further. Joseph Wu, the outgoing foreign minister, makes clear that American support for Ukraine is critical for Asia, signalling that America will also support Taiwan. This steely sense of realism is found elsewhere. After the Ukraine invasion, Kishida Fumio, Japan’s prime minister, jettisoned a policy of rapprochement towards Russia and embraced Western sanctions. Japan plans to almost double defence spending over five years. Despite being formally pacifist it is closer than ever to being committed to help America defend