The philosophy — and politics — behind Canada's reluctance to meet NATO's spending target

There was an unscripted moment during a panel debate in Toronto last month that could go a long way toward explaining Canada's long-term reluctance to publicly and wholeheartedly embrace NATO's guideline for members' defence spending.

Appearing on a panel at the Eurasia's group's U.S.-Canada Summit, the typically unflappable Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly was asked pointedly how Ottawa could be considered a reliable ally when it appears unable — or unwilling — to meet the western military alliance's benchmark of spending at least two per cent of GDP on defence.

Offering up a dash of realpolitik, the moderator spoke about the enduring debate over the value of hard (military) power versus soft (diplomatic, development) power and said that at the end of the day, «hard power is what tends to shake out promises in the world» from other countries.

Joly was having none of it.

«That's your assessment,» she said. «We believe in the international rules-based order where rules must be followed, and, you know, small and big countries have the same rules that they have to follow.»

The suggestion that hard power is somehow an affront to the «international rules based order» — that jargony mouthful governments (especially Canada's) like to invoke — speaks volumes.

The philosophical argument against hard power is not something that has been widely discussed in the often circular debate about NATO's expectations of member states.

Without question, most governments — regardless of their political stripe — would prefer to spend money on something other than defence. But the fact remains that over the seven-and-a-half decades since NATO was created, NATO allies' defence spending has tended to rise in times of heightened international